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Abstract 
This short position paper is intended to provide a critique of 
current approaches to dialogue, as well as a roadmap for col-
laborative dialogue research.   It is unapologetically opin-
ionated, but informed by 40 years of dialogue research.  No 
attempt is made to be comprehensive.   The paper will dis-
cuss current research into building so-called “chatbots”, 
slot-filling dialogue systems, and plan-based dialogue sys-
tems.   For further discussion of some of these issues, please 
see (Allen et al., in press).   
Chatbots 
The currently dominant approach to building dialogue sys-
tems, particularly those commonly referred to as “chatbots”, 
is to train a neural network-based system “end-to-end” 
based on a large corpus of human-human dialogues, poten-
tially supplemented with other information.  Such chatbots 
have been developed by many researchers and corporations, 
either for the purpose of so-called “chit-chat” about arbitrary 
topics, or occasionally to engage in goal-directed transac-
tional dialogues in limited domains (e.g., (Ghazvininejad et 
al., 2018)).   
Without getting into the specifics of how these systems 
are constructed, it is apparent that such an approach provides 
a method for imitating a dialogue but not for participating 
in one. We can see the limitations of the approach from ex-
amples like these: 
Human: what is your job ? Machine: i ’m a lawyer . 
Human: what do you do ?  Machine: i ’m a doctor   
 (Vinyals & Le, 2015).  
 
A: I wish [...] would introduce another vegetarian option be-
sides the shroomburger. It’s delicious but kind of ridiculous. 
B: This is the best j.crew in the world. Try the lemonade.     
(Ghazvininejad et al., 2018).   
In addition to being unable to track the topic of the con-
versation, a major missing aspect of human behavior is ap-
parent from Google’s suggested responses to emails, which 
have been trained over huge corpora of human-human con-
versations. Though the responses may be appropriate in 
many contexts, the user still needs to supply the intention.  
The primary characteristics of having an intention are that 
having an intention leads to action,  and the agent is commit-
ted to achieving that action (Bratman, 1987; Cohen & 
Levesque, 1990).    If the agent tries and fails, the agent will 
try again (if it believes the action is still possible).    Neural 
net chatbots do not  do this -- they do not attempt to achieve 
an action or effect with their utterances, and upon failure de-
vise or plan another means to do so.  I claim that to partici-
pate in a dialogue,  one needs to have such intentions to 
achieve effects via communication.  Intentions are inti-
mately related to plans in that the agent plans to achieve its 
goals, and the elements of those plans become intentions.    
The plan-based approach to dialogue was begun 40 years 
ago (Bruce, 1975; Cohen & Perrault, 1979; Allen & Per-
rault, 1980; Perrault & Allen, 1980) and has seen occasional 
developments since then (e.g., the Artimis system (Sadek et 
al., 1997) and Allen et al’s recent work  (Galescu et al., 
2018)).  We will return to this approach below. 
Slot-filling Dialogue Systems 
Whereas chatbots are built to talk about any topic for which 
human-human conversational training data is available,  a 
more domain-limited approach is to build so-called “task-
oriented” dialogue systems.   First, a bit of history.   Task-
oriented dialogue systems were originally intended to give 
the user instructions and guidance in performing an action, 
such as to assemble an object, such as an air compressor 
(Grosz, 1977).    Current efforts have concentrated on a more 
limited objective, namely to get the system to perform some 
action for the user, such as to book a hotel or restaurant res-
ervation.   The core problem that is addressed is to fill out 
required and optional attribute-values (termed “slots”)  in an 
action schema or “frame” for example, the date, time, and 
number of people for a restaurant reservation.   If an  argu-
ment is missing, the system asks the user to supply it.    
Dating back to the Gus system (Bobrow et al., 1977), slot-
filling dialogue systems are a narrow slice of transactional 
dialogue systems.  The influential POMDP-based reinforce-
ment-learned slot-filling systems (e.g.,   (Young et al., 
2013)) attempt to train an optimal dialogue policy using re-
inforcement learning in response to actions taken by a “user 
simulator”  (Schatzman et al., 2007), perhaps bootstrapped 
via Wizard of Oz-derived data.   That is, during training the 
dialogue system issues a response to the user simulator and 
is rewarded or penalized based on how the ultimate dialogue 
is evaluated.   The Dialogue State Tracking Challenge (Wil-
liams et al., 2013) has created a number of slot-filling dia-
logue corpora, which have led many groups to build such 
systems.   
Slot-filling dialogue systems are limited in a number of 
ways.  First, the current approach to building these systems  
limits the set of logical forms the dialogue system can con-
sider by avoiding complex meaning representations.  For ex-
ample,  slot-filling systems can be trained to expect simple 
atomic responses like “7pm”  to its question “what time do 
you want to eat?”   However, the systems typically will not 
accept such reasonable but complex responses as “not be-
fore 7pm,”  “between 7 and 8 pm,” or “the earliest time 
available.”   What’s missing from these systems are true 
logical forms that employ a variety of operators (e.g., and, 
or, not, all, if-then-else, some, every, before, after, count, 
superlatives, comparatives, etc.).  Many of these require 
scoped representations.  For example,  “What is the closest 
parking to the Japanese restaurant nearest to the Space 
Needle?” will have two superlative expressions, one embed-
ded within the other.  Furthermore, adequate meaning rep-
resentations are compositional, such as the one underlying 
“What are the three best Chinese or Japanese restaurants 
within walking distance of Century Link Field?” They can 
also encode hypothetical information, as in “If I take the 
American Airlines morning flight to Sydney,  would I be able 
to arrive the next day?” The evaluation of such expressions, 
with count, disjunction, and/or conditional operators, would 
prove problematic for neural network algorithms that 
merely “attend” to a knowledge base rather than evaluate the 
logical form.    Among the other difficulties encountered by 
such systems are so-called “multi-intent”  utterances that es-
sentially require database joins.  However, complex logical 
forms such as these can now be produced robustly from   
competent neural network semantic parsers (e.g., Duong et 
al., 2017; Wang et al., 2015).   
Second,  reinforcement-learned dialogue systems are 
limited by the capabilities of  the user simulators used to 
train them. Typically, these simulators have a stack of goals 
that are derived from the operations of slot-filling, either to 
inform the user of the result of an action, or to request the 
user to provide a value for a slot. However, there are many 
more types of goals involved in dialogues (Galescu et al., 
2018) such as to abandon a goal, re-attempt a goal, etc.  Fur-
thermore, many utterances one might reasonably ask do not 
involve specific slots per se, but rather involve constraints 
that the slot values need to satisfy. The current simulators 
do not support generating such utterances, and thus because 
they do not provide the requisite training data, the dialogue 
system cannot learn the behavior. 
Third, the dialogue initiative is rigidly prescribed.  Es-
sentially, the user makes a request, the system asks for the 
missing information, the user supplies that information, the 
system (eventually) confirms the action to be performed, the 
user agrees or disconfirms, etc.   However, real dialogues 
can have many shifts of initiative in which the parties col-
laborate to accomplish goals.  
To put these missing capabilities in one example that 
shows the need for a more powerful logical form language 
and for mixed initiative dialogue processing, consider this 
conversation: 
1. U:  Please book a reservation at the closest good res-
taurant to the Orpheum Theater on Monday for 4 
people. 
2. S:  OK,  what time would you like to eat? 
3. U:  what’s the earliest time available? 
4. S:  6 pm 
5. U:  too early 
6. S:  how about 7 pm? 
7. U:  OK 
8. S:  OK, shall I make a reservation at Guillaume for 
4 people at 7pm? 
9. U:  Sure. 
10. S:  Done! 
11. U: Can you let Sharon know? 
12. S:  What is her phone number? 
13. U: It’s 650-123-4567 
14. S:  OK,  sending text to Sharon that you have a res-
ervation at Guillaume on Monday for 4 people. 
 
Here the system has responded to the user’s complex request 
with a slot-filling question (2), the effect of which is that the 
user believes the system wants to know the time that the user 
wants to eat.  Rather than answer the question, the user re-
plies with another question (3),  a not infrequent occurrence 
though it violates the typical assumptions of simple dialogue 
systems.  Notice that Question (3) starts a subdialogue (3-7) 
to find the time the user wants to eat.  Question (3)  is in-
tended to establish  a constraint on the desired time in the 
effect of (2).  The times specified by the system in (4) and 
(6) are not times the user wants to eat but proposed available 
times,  the latter of which is confirmed as the desired  time 
by the user in (7).   The disconfirm speech act in (5) indicates 
that the time proposed by the system is not desired.    How-
ever, the slot-filling approach assumes that it is the user who 
fills the slots that have been requested, rather than confirm-
ing values that have proposed by the system. In fact, any 
subdialogue that results in the state in which the system 
knows the time the user wants to eat should be acceptable.  
Utterance (8) is multifunctional in that it informs the user 
of the restaurant that the system has found to satisfy the 
user’s constraints, and requests permission to book it.  What 
matters here are the goals being accomplished, not the dia-
logue act labels themselves.  The  indirect request in (11) 
assumes a propositional anaphor  (the booking event) as the 
content of the requested informative action.  Then in (12) 
the system asks a slot-filling question whose answer it needs 
to know in order to perform an inferred action that satisfies 
the indirect request in (11).  Unlike exchange (2)-(3), this 
time a literal question (which is interpreted as a request) 
from the user is followed by a question from the system, 
which shows again a shift of initiative.  Current approaches 
have yet to be able to handle reasonable dialogues such as 
this.  We argue that an approach based on plans/goals/inten-
tions that reason over the effects of speech acts operating on 
proper logical forms can derive the appropriate communica-
tive acts in such dialogues.   
Plan-based Model of Dialogue Dialogue researchers 
have long emphasized that conversation is best analyzed as 
a special case of plan-based collaborative behavior  (Grosz 
& Sidner, 1990).  Plan-based interaction acknowledges that 
communication is a special case of purposeful behavior (Al-
len & Perrault, 1980; Cohen & Perrault, 1979).  Collabora-
tive interaction involves agents  being jointly committed to 
their partners’ success (Cohen & Levesque, 1991).  In doing 
so, an agent recognizes its partner’s plans to achieve the 
joint goal, and then performs actions to facilitate them.  Peo-
ple have learned to be helpful at a very young age and are 
strongly expected to collaborate as part of ordinary social 
interaction (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; see video). In 
general,  people’s plans involve  physical (and now digital) 
acts, as well as speech acts (such as requests, questions, con-
firmations, etc.)  When the process of collaboration is ap-
plied to communication, people infer the reasons behind 
their interlocutor’s utterances and attempt to ensure their 
success by (at least) telling them what they need to know to 
be successful, and by potentially volunteering to perform ac-
tions on their behalf.  Such reasoning is apparent when a 
system responds to the user’s asking “Where is Dunkirk 
playing?” with “It’s playing at the Roxy theater at 7:30pm, 
however it is sold out.”     Here the literal and truthful answer 
(shown here in plain font) is not sufficient and a respondent 
who knew that the theater was sold out would be considered 
uncooperative.  A  collaborator, on the other hand, will go 
beyond inferring the user’s plan by attempting to debug that 
plan.   If the plan is expected to fail, the collaborator may 
develop and suggest (or execute) an alternative plan to 
achieve the user’s higher-level goal.   To continue the movie 
example,  a collaborative assistant system might then say 
“It’s also showing at the Forum theater tomorrow at 8pm, 
and tickets are available.  Would you like me to purchase 
them?”  In order to provide such responses, the system 
needs to infer that people may want to know where an entity 
is (the location where the movie is showing), in order to go 
there (the theater), in order to perform a normal activity done 
on that entity at that location (watch a movie). The system 
checks the plan’s preconditions (watching a movie requires 
that the agent has a ticket), and also the applicability condi-
tions (tickets must be available).  If the latter fails, the inten-
tion is impossible so the system will drop it and attempt to 
find another plan to achieve the higher level goal (of having 
seen the movie). The prototype system we would demon-
strate at the workshop engages in the reasoning above.  Such 
                                                 
1 Note that the system needs to represent that the user knows the answer 
without representing what the user thinks the answer to be (or it would not 
need to ask).  Such reasoning would be important in deciding whom to ask 
helpful conversational behavior is a paradigmatic example 
of human-AI collaboration. 
However, except for hand-built examples, current virtual 
assistant systems are not typically providing such assis-
tance.  In order to build systems that can engage humans in 
collaborative plan-based dialogue, research is needed on 
planning, plan recognition, and reasoning about people’s 
mental and social states (beliefs, desires, goals, intentions, 
permissions, obligations, etc.), and their relation to conven-
tional behavior. Plan recognition involves observing ac-
tions and inferring the (structure of) reasons why those ac-
tions were performed, often to enable the actor to perform 
still other actions (Allen & Perrault, 1980; Geib & Gold-
man, 2009; Sukthankar, et al., 2014). Belief-desire-inten-
tion (BDI) theory (Cohen & Levesque, 1990) and architec-
tures (Bratman et al., 1988) within the subfield of Multi-
Agent Systems are intimately related to dialogue pro-
cessing. Prior research, including our own,  has developed 
prototypes of the above collaborative processing, and has 
shown that such collaborative BDI architectures and epis-
temic reasoning can form the basis for dialogue managers 
(Allen & Perrault, 1980; Cohen & Perrault, 1979; Sadek et 
al., 1997).    
However, though the BDI approach has been researched 
for many years, with few exceptions (e.g., Allen’s group at 
the University of Rochester/IHMC (Galescu et al., 2018)), 
it has not seen recent system application to collaborative 
dialogue.   Our recent plan-based dialogue manager proto-
type (which I will demonstrate at the workshop) uses the 
same planner to reason about physical and speech acts, en-
abling the system to plan yes/no and wh-questions when 
the user is believed to know the answers1,  to make requests 
when the system wants the effect and the user is believed 
to be able to perform the requested action, to inform the 
user of facts the user is not believed to already know, to 
suggest actions that the user may want that would further 
the user’s goals, etc.   
Concluding Remarks 
 Our overall multi-year program of research is to build a 
scalable collaborative dialogue component based on plan-
ning/plan recognition.  In order to build a collaborative ar-
chitecture for use with communicative actions and that rea-
sons about users’ mental states (beliefs, goals, intentions), 
we are investigating probabilistic planning and plan recog-
nition algorithms (Geib & Goldman, 2009) along with ep-
istemic, intentional, and constraint reasoning. 
Because the dialogue manager operates at the level of 
plans and goals as applied to physical, digital, and commu-
nicative acts, it can be domain independent.  The logical 
forms encode domain dependent predicates and actions, as 
derived from the backend APIs, database schemas, and 
knowledge base (Duong et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2015).  
a question. Such “quantifying-in” (Allen & Perrault, 1980; Cohen & Per-
rault, 1979; Kaplan, 1968; Quine, 1956) rules out using simple databases 
to represent a user’s belief state. 
The domain actions that the planner/plan recognizer oper-
ate over can be discovered by crowd-sourcing and text 
mining  (Fast et al., 2016; Jiang & Riloff, 2018). 
The plan/plan recognition component could either be the 
engine of a complete dialogue manager, or it could gener-
ate possible response plans that then could be used to train 
a dialogue management component, similar to the “dia-
logue self-play”  approach of (Shah et al., 2018). Thus, 
simulated dialogues that are situationally relevant could be 
created, and once paraphrased by a crowd with actual ut-
terances, could be used for training (Duong et al., 2017; 
Shah et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2015). A plan-based dia-
logue manager that performs both planning and plan recog-
nition could thus play both sides of a collaborative conver-
sation by planning and interpreting speech acts and their 
propositional content, given parties’ differing beliefs about 
the world state, goals and intentions.    In this way, a system 
could learn how to reason, plan, and converse.     
Finally, we are interested in systems that can explain 
their actions.  Such systems should be able to answer ques-
tions such as “why did you say that?”  Because a plan-
based dialogue system has created plans that stand behind 
its utterances, it can explain what the utterance(s) were in-
tended to achieve.  
References 
Allen, J. F. and Perrault, C. R.,   Analyzing intention in ut-
terances, Artificial intelligence 15 (3), 143-178. 
Allen, J. F., André, E., Cohen, P. R., Hakkani-Tür, D., 
Kaplan, R., Lemon, O., Traum, D., Challenge discussion: 
Advancing multimodal dialogue,   in Handbook of Multi-
modal-Multisensor Interfaces, Oviatt, S. L., Schuller, B., 
Cohen, P. R., Sonntag, D., Potamianos, G., and Krüger, 
A., ACM Press/Morgan & Claypool Publishers, in press. 
Bobrow, D. G., Kaplan, R. M., Kay, M., Norman, D. A., 
Thompson, H., and Winograd, T. GUS, a frame-driven di-
alog system. Artificial Intelligence, 8(2), 1977, 155-173. 
Bratman, M. E., Israel, D. and Pollack, M. E., Plans and re-
source-bounded practical reasoning. Comp. Intelligence, 
4:349-355, 1988. 
Bratman. M. E., Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987. 
Bruce, B. C., Generation as a social action, Proc. of the 
Workshop on Theoretical Issues in Natural Language 
Processing, ACL, 1975. 
Cohen, P. R. and Levesque, H. J., Intention is choice with 
commitment, Artif. Intelligence, 42 (2-3), 1990, 213-261. 
Cohen P. R. and Levesque, H. J.  Teamwork,  Noûs, 1991.  
Cohen, P. R. and Perrault, C. R., Elements of a plan-based 
theory of speech acts, Cognitive Science, 3(3), 1979. 
Duong, L., Afshar, H., Estival, D., Pink, G., Cohen, P. R., 
and Johnson M.  Multilingual Semantic Parsing and 
Code-switching, Proc. of the 21st Conf. on Computa-
tional Natural Language Learning (CoNLL 2017),  2017, 
pp. 379-389.  
Fast, E., McGrath, W., Rajpurkar, P. and Bernstein, M. 
Augur: Mining Human Behaviors from Fiction to Power 
Interactive Systems. Proc. of the 2016 CHI Conference 
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, ACM Press, 
2016. 
Galescu,  L., Teng,  C. M.,  Allen  J. F., and  Pereira, I. Co-
gent:  A  Generic  Dialogue  System  Shell  Based  on  a  
Collaborative  Problem  Solving  Model, Proceedings of 
SigDial, Assoc. for Computational Linguistics, 2018, 
400-409.  
Geib, C., and Goldman, R.P., A probabilistic plan recogni-
tion algorithm based on plan tree grammars, Artificial In-
telligence, 2009. 
Ghazvininejad, M., Brockett, C.,Chang, M-W., Dolan, B., 
Gao, J.,Yih, W-T, Galley, M.  A Knowledge-Grounded 
Neural Conversation Model, Proc. of AAAI, 2018. 
Grosz, B. J., The structure of task-oriented dialogues, Proc. 
of IEEE Speech Symposium, Carnegie Mellon University, 
1974. 
Grosz, B. J., & Sidner, C., Plans for discourse, in Intentions 
in Communication, Cohen, P. R., Morgan, J., and Pollack, 
M. E., MIT Press, 1990. 
Jiang, T.,  and Riloff, E.,  Learning prototypical goal activi-
ties for locations, Proc. of Assoc. for Comp. Ling., 2018, 
1297-1307. 
Kaplan, D. Quantifying in, Synthese 19(1/2), 1968, 178-214. 
Perrault, C. R. and Allen, J. F., A plan-based analysis of in-
direct speech acts,  Comp. Ling., 6(3-4), 1980, 167-182. 
Quine, W. V. O. Quantifiers and propositional attitudes, 
Journal of Philosophy 53(5), 1956, 177-187. 
Sadek, D., Bretier, P., and Panaget, F., ARTIMIS: Natural 
dialogue meets rational agency, Proc.  IJCAI-15, 1997, 
pp. 1030-1035. 
Shah, P., Hakkani-Tür, D., Tür, G., Rastogi, A., Bapna, A., 
Nayak, N., Heck, L., Building a conversational agent 
overnight with dialogue self-play, arXiv: 1801.04871v1, 
Jan., 2018. 
Sukthankar, G., Geib, C., Bui, H., Pynadath, D., and Gold-
man, R., Plan, Activity, and Intent Recognition: Theory 
and Practice, San Francisco: Morgan Kauffman Publish-
ers, 2014. 
Vinyals, O., and Le, Q. A neural conversational model.   
Proc. of ICML, 2015. 
Wang, Y., Berant, J., and Liang, P., Building a semantic par-
ser overnight, Proc. of Assoc. for Comp. Ling., 2015, 
1332–1342.  
Warneke, F. and Tomasello, M. Altruistic Helping in Hu-
man Infants and Young Chimpanzees, Science  311(5765) 
03 Mar 2006, 1301-1303 (2006).  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-eU5xZW7cU 
Williams, J., Raux, A., Ramachandran, D. and Black A.The 
Dialog State Tracking Challenge, Proc. of SIGDIAL 
2013, Assoc. for Comp Linguistics, 2013, 404-413. 
Young, S., Gasic, M., Thomson, B., and Williams, J. D. 
POMDP-based Statistical Spoken Dialogue Systems: A 
review. Proc. IEEE, 101(5),  2013, 1160-1179. 
